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Abstract   Real options analysis shows that fishery harvesting becomes more
conservative, and catch efficiency is raised, when exploitation is subject to irre-
versibility, uncertainty, and delay for a cooperative profit-maximizing fleet. With
Rock Lobster catch and effort data from Fisheries Victoria of the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment in Australia, the options-augmented sur-
plus-yield model is tested and compared with the performance of its
conventional profit-maximizing and biological maximum-sustainable-yield coun-
terparts.
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Introduction
Commercial aggregate catch per unit effort (CPUE) is affected by numerous factors:
individual fishing effort, stock abundance and concentration, capture success prob-
ability, licenses and quotas, and seasonal/spatial variations (Seber 1982; Burnham et
al. 1987; Hilborn and Walters 1992; Wallace, Lindner, and Dole 1997). In this paper,
a theory of harvesting is developed to show that stock-size uncertainty can affect op-
timal fishing effort, harvesting catch and the resulting CPUE.
We begin with the institutional framework of cooperative profit-maximizing li-
cense-restricted fishery. Suppose the fishermen’s co-op targets a biologically sus-
tainable harvest and a mutually agreed and legally binding division of economics re-
turns that allows also for differing management goals, such as those arising from
different rates of discount or supply conditions among fishermen. This can be
achieved in practice through internal transfer payments with the economic returns
from the fishery to any one fisherman not dependent solely upon that fisherman’s
harvest (Munro 1979, 1996).
We further assume that the fishermen face a competitive output market, are
given deterministic market conditions about price and cost, enjoy the absence of il-
legal poaching or encroachment from outsiders, harvest sustainably with a stable
technology, and have identical, rational expectations about uncertain future fish
stock dynamics, whose movements are spanned by existing financial instruments or
their combinations in well-functioning capital markets, where all risks are efficiently
priced (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, ch. 9). The following decision problem is then
posed for the fishermen: for logistical reasons the fleet could only be deployed once
in each harvesting period, and the fishermen were to determine their collective
profit-maximizing effort.
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Preliminaries
First let us examine three preconditions: future stock uncertainty, irreversible har-
vesting, and delay. Before periodic harvesting occurs, fishermen face an uncertain
future dynamic profile of the stock size under surplus-yield harvesting. For example,
habitat can change, regenerated stock can migrate, new recruitment can come from out-
side spawning stock, and there may be unforeseen environmental changes. Supposing
that the present stock or its initial state is known with certainty, we model the sto-
chastic behavior of fish stock (X) by the following geometric Brownian motion:
dX = α Xdt + σ Xdz (1)
where dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process (Dixit 1991); α  is the
intracycle stock movement within a harvest period and is distinct from intercycle
stock regeneration that gives rise to the usual biological stock-recruitment process,
viz. metered age-structured models (Clark 1990); σ  is the instantaneous standard de-
viation on fish stock capturing the uncertainty surrounding future regeneration.
Since regeneration would be offset by a sustainable harvest in each harvesting cycle
and all harvesting cycles are identical, the resulting stock X, as specified in equation
(1), will represent the sustained stock resulting from identical harvest and regenera-
tion in the previous cycle. To harvest from such a stock, we postulate the following
production function:
H(E, X) ≡  ASY = qEX (2)
where ASY is the average sustainable surplus yield; E the harvesting effort (control
variable); and q is the fixed catchability coefficient.
The second precondition is irreversible harvesting. In general, an investment is
irreversible if capital invested cannot be recouped should adverse market conditions
render it unworthy after investing (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Harvesting can be irre-
versible since the harvested stock cannot be returned to the habitat. As a result, a
harvest decision based on deterministic market conditions and uncertain future stock
size cannot be unwound after it has been exercised.
Finally, the harvesting decision can be delayed. If the fish stock is not harvested
now it will still be available for harvesting at any future time within the harvesting
cycle. Therefore, harvesting is not a now-or-never proposition. Without illegal poaching
or encroachment from outsiders, this would be the case as if a single decision-maker
were dominating the management and controlling the fishery (Munro 1979, 1996).
Using the real options analogy, the fleet has the right, but not the obligation to exer-
cise the harvesting option, depending on how deep in the money that option is.
The Model
Using equation (2), the profit π (E, X) in a harvesting period by exerting effort E un-
der stock size X is:
π (E, X) = pqEX – cE (3)
where p and c are per unit catch price and effort cost, respectively. Quantity π (E, X)
is realized only if harvesting takes place. Let F(X) be the value of the harvesting op-
portunity, which includes equation (3) and the option value of harvesting. This is the
value of the right or the option to exercise the irreversible harvesting decision. F(X)Option Value of Harvesting 137
is obtained by maximizing equation (3) over the effort level E subject to a constraint
on the stochastic dynamics of the stock in equation (1). Assuming a no-arbitrage-op-
portunities equilibrium discount rate ρ  (Brealey and Myers 1992) and applying Ito’s
lemma, we derive the behavior of F(X) while harvesting is not taking place as:
1
2
0 22 σα ρ X F XF F XX X +− = . (4)
When harvesting takes place, the irreversible harvesting option is exercised and F(X)
becomes π (E, X). Using equations (3) and (4), our objective is to find the optimal
effort solution. Label it Eop. We design a decision rule which requires that whenever
the stock level reaches a certain threshold (Xop), fishermen harvest according to Eop.
Since π (E, X) is linear in X, the regime we describe will consist of a “bang-bang”
controlled harvesting at Eop whenever X ≥  Xop, and not harvesting otherwise (Clark
1990). Consequently, the harvesting decision can be delayed.
The differential equation (4) has two auxiliary quadratic roots: the larger-than-
positive-one root β 1, and the negative root β 2. Assuming α  < ρ , then by the method

















where A is an undetermined coefficient and Xop is the threshold above which optimal
harvesting occurs. When X < Xop, F consists entirely of the option value (AXβ 1). To solve
for A and Xop we need two conditions:
















   (smooth-pasting) (7)
Condition (6) requires that, at the boundary between harvesting and not harvesting,
the fleet be indifferent and, therefore, attach the same F to the value of the harvest-
ing opportunity and profit. Condition (7) guarantees continuity of the slope of F at
the point of indifference so that F remains the same whether Xop is approached from
the left or the right (Dixit 1993). Solving equations (3), (6), and (7) gives the level









Therefore, the harvesting decision will only be profitable if harvesting revenue
p·qEXop covers the harvesting cost cE and equation (8):
Π (, ) E X p qEX cE
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where Π (E, Xop) is the harvesting profit function that also accounts for the option
value. Since the fleet has power to exert its effort at Eop in equation (9), it maximizes
its group harvesting profit at the optimal level represented by Π op(Eop, Xop). Compar-
ing with traditional profit maximization vis-à-vis equation (3), the profit in equation
(9) is a result of exercising the fishing option whenever the stock size is favorable at
X ≥  Xop. This profit is diminished by the value of such an option that is killed as a
consequence of fishing. The diminution is measured by the term (β 1 – 1)/β 1. Since
equation (9) does not involve any ad hoc fisheries stock-recruitment parameters, it
becomes significant in its generality. For example, although different fisheries are
better explained by species-specific models, they are invariably expressed in a rela-
tionship linking harvesting effort and the sustained stock. We demonstrate this gen-









(Clark 1990, ch.2) where k is the ceiling stock size and r is the intrinsic natural
growth rate. After inserting Eop and Xop, solving for Xop, and substituting it out in
































where q is the fixed catchability coefficient. Since β 1 is larger than one, β 1/(β 1 – 1)
must also be larger than one and is known as the option-value multiple (hence the
subscript op). This multiple has the effect of slowing down harvest rate and making
the benefit-cost decision more conservative because benefits have to overcome both
costs as well as the value of keeping the harvesting options open and alive (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994). Furthermore, the option-value multiple will become larger and the fish-
ing effort correspondingly more conservative as the uncertainty element becomes
more pervasive.1 In the effort equation (11) with fixed q and k, fish price p will not
only have to overcome unit effort cost c, but also the option-value multiple β 1/(β 1 – 1)































Therefore, conservative effort leads to more subdued harvesting and increases CPUE
in equation (12).
1 It can be shown that an increase in σ  decreases β 1, increasing the option-value multiple.Option Value of Harvesting 139
Estimation Results
We statistically test equation (12) using catch and effort data for the Victorian rock
lobster fishery, which is license-controlled with individual transferable quotas under
a co-management system involving fishermen, managers, and recreationists. To fa-





















Equation (13) is estimated using monthly time-series data for CPUEop. Each harvest-
ing cycle is sufficiently small to assume that the intracycle stock movement α  is
practically zero. Quantities q and k are estimated from Schnute’s procedure (Schnute
1977). Quantity p is proxied by gross value of production divided by total catch. The
Victorian unit fishing effort cost, c, is proxied by Melbourne all-group consumer
price index which covers a fisherman’s basic fishing and vessel expenses. Quantity µ
is a scale parameter whose size depends on the units of measurement for c and p.
The hypothesis H0:µ  > 0 versus H1:µ  ≤  0 was tested on the Eastern and Western
Zones of Port Phillip Bay, Australia, separately. Appendix A contained a description
of the data. Schnute’s procedure produced the surplus-yield model estimates in ap-
pendix table B1. Using the estimated q and k, a linear regression was then fitted to
equation (13) with a suppressed constant. The estimation results were reported in
appendix tables B2 and B3.
The regression results suggest that, at a 5% level of significance, the hypothesis
of a positive µ —a positive relationship between CPUE and the option-value mul-
tiple—cannot be rejected by evidence. We thus conclude that the model given in sec-
tion 3 for Victorian rock lobster harvesting under uncertainty can be accepted as a
competing hypothesis.
We have also provided the corresponding estimates for the conventional profit-
maximizing Gordon-Schaefer model and the biological maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) model in appendix B. The Gordon-Schaefer model restricts the option-value
multiple to unity. The MSY model further restricts the cost/price ratio to be con-
stant. Under our cooperative framework comparable with the incentive-compatible
sole-owner controlled fishery, both model adequacy and parameter estimate preci-
sion decrease with the level of reality in the order of the three models, with the op-
tion-value model having the best performance.
Conclusion
In addition to harvesting profit, there is also an intrinsic value of keeping the har-
vesting options alive when stock exploitation is subject to irreversibility, uncer-
tainty, and delay. This renders harvesting more conservative. Using the Victorian
rock lobster catch and effort data in Australia, the uncertainty-augmented maximum-
profit surplus-yield model was tested and found to have outperformed its conven-
tional and maximum-sustainable-yield counterparts. There is one caveat: we as-
sumed a priori that the uncertain component of the future stock evolution was de-
scribed by Brownian motion in the form of a standard Wiener process; i.e., uncer-
tainty was bias-neutral and could be positive or negative with equal likelihood. If
uncertainty is biased against the downside—more likely for stock to turn out higher
than lower, then the option value of harvesting will be increased and the conserva-
tism will be reinforced. On the other hand, if uncertainty is biased against the up-Li 140
side, then the conservatism will be muted and option value will be lowered. In the
latter case, we cannot say definitively that fishing effort will still be lower than
when there exists no uncertainty.
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Appendix A
Data
Variable Description Sample Period Source
Catch (H) Monthly lobster June 1977 to December 1996 Victorian Fisheries Catch
catch in kg excluding out-of-season and Effort Information
months Bulletin (DNRE 1996)
Effort (E) Monthly number ibid. ibid.
of potlifts
CPUEop Average fisherman ibid. ibid.
daily CPUEs for the
month (kg per potlift)
Standard Standard deviation ibid. ibid.
   deviation of of fisherman daily
   CPUEop (σ ) CPUEs for the month
(kg per potlift)
Lobster Monthly lobster December 1978 to ibid.
   price (p) catch price per kg December 1996
Unit effort Monthly Melbourne April 1985 to Victorian Monthly
   cost (c) all-purpose consumer December 1996 Summary of Statistics
price index (Australian Bureau of
(base = 100 at 1979/80) Statistics, Cat. No. 5229.2)
Discount All capitals monthly July 1983 to ibid.
   rate (ρ ) average indicative December 1996




Schnute’s Estimates for Victorian Rock Lobster Catch and Effort
Surplus Yield Model Eastern Zone Western Zone
Intrinsic growth rate r 0.31 0.83
Catchability coefficient q 1.8x10–6 4.3x10–6
Ceiling stock size k 360,000 250,000
Model adequacy F(2,197) = 10.79 F(2,202) = 9.17
(p = 0.00) (p = 0.00)
Table B2
Explaining Victorian Rock Lobster CPUE (Western Zone) by: (1) Option-value Model,
(2) Conventional Profit-maximization Model, and (3) Biological MSY Model
(1) Option (2) Profit- (3) Biological
Western Zone Value Model maximization Model MSY Model *
µ  (scale parameter) 3.4x10–3 1.7x10–3 19.6x10–3
Standard error 1.5x10–3 3.7x10–3 17.5x10–3
p-value 0.02 0.65 0.27
Model adequacy F(1,111) = 4.13 F(1,111) = 1.03 F(1,111) = 0.00
(p = 0.04) (p = 0.31) (p = 1.00)
Table B3
Explaining Victorian Rock Lobster CPUE (Eastern Zone) by: (1) Option-value Model,
(2) Conventional Profit-maximization Model, and (3) Biological MSY Model
(1) Option (2) Profit- (3) Biological
Eastern Zone Value Model maximization Model MSY Model *
µ 9.6x10–3 18.0x10–3 72.4x10–3
Standard error 9.2x10–4 2.5x10–3 12.7x10–3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model adequacy F(1,112) = 58.94 F(1,112) = 15.99 F(1,112) = 0.00
(p = 0.00) (p = 0.00) (p = 1.00)
* Assuming a constant unit effort cost-catch price ratio